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What the commentators do agree on is that double jeopardy is a realm of law
so confusing, so replete with contradictions, corrections, and exceptions to
the rules, that after 120 years no sensible meaning or policy has evolved.'
L Introduction
Prior to 1989, courts could easily resolve a Double Jeopardy Clause2
defense to a civil proceeding brought by the Government - the Clause
simply did not apply to civil proceedings.' Then, the Supreme Court held
in United States v. Halper4 that a civil proceeding brought by the Govern-
ment following a criminal conviction based on the same conduct violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause to the extent that the civil sanction was punitive.'
1. Barbara A. Mack, Double Jeopardy - Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punishment:
Who Determines What Punishments Fit the Crime, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 217, 218 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to
Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRI. L. REV. 1, 44 (1993) (stating that Supreme Court
did not find Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to civil proceedings prior to 1989 Halper
decision).
4. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
5. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that, to extent civil
sanction was punitive, Double Jeopardy Clause barred Government from seeking civil sanction
against criminally convicted defendant for same conduct). In Halper, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of civil proceedings brought by the Government against a
defendant previously convicted of the same offense in a criminal trial. Id. at 439-40. Halper
filed 65 false Medicare claims and received overpayments from the Government in the amount
of $585. Id. at 437. A trial court convicted Halper of criminal violations of the False Claims
Act. Id. The court sentenced Halper to two years in prison and fined him $5,000. Id. The
Government then brought a civil proceeding, also under the False Claims Act, seeking statu-
tory civil sanctions in excess of $130,000. Id. at 438. Analyzing Halper's claim as arising
under the multiple punishments protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court consid-
ered whether the civil sanction imposed on Halper constituted an unconstitutional second pun-
ishment. Id. at 441. Rejecting labels of civil and criminal as dispositive, the Court deter-
mined that even sanctions labeled civil were punitive when they had punitive purposes. Id.
at 447-48. The Court held that when a sanction cannot "fairly" be described as remedial but
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The decision enabled defendants to raise a double jeopardy defense when-
ever faced with successive criminal and civil proceedings brought by the
Government6 and instructed lower courts to apply the standards announced
in Halper.7 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held in S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission' that an administrative sanction following a criminal conviction
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause even though the sanction did not exceed
the Government's costs of investigation and prosecution.9 The Seventh
Circuit recognized the split that Healy caused with the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hudson, °
only as punitive, the sanction is punishment and barred by double jeopardy to the extent that
it is punitive. Id. at 448-49. Because Halper's civil sanction greatly exceeded the actual
damages to the Government as found by the trial court, the Court held that the sanction was
punishment, but it remanded for further proceedings with regard to the actual amount of the
Government's damages. Id. at 452.
6. See Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn
by Any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1235, 1251 (1995) (noting
different situations in which defendant can raise double jeopardy defense based on Halper);
Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of United
States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 956-58 (1990) (observing that Halper allowed courts
to review civil sanctions by Government and predicting rise in double jeopardy defense in
various types of cases).
7. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (giving discretion to trial courts to decide at what
amount civil sanction becomes punitive).
8. 96 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 1996).
9. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
910-11 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that administrative fine by OSHRC was punitive as applied
even though it was less than Government's costs of investigation and prosecution), petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299). In Healy, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether a sanction assessed by
OSHRC subsequent to the defendant's criminal conviction on the same Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) violations constituted a second punishment barred by double jeopardy.
Id. at 907-08. Healy, a corporation, committed over 60 violations of OSHA that resulted in
the deaths of three employees. Id. at 907. Finding the violations to be "wilful," a trial court
criminally convicted Healy and fined it $750,000. Id. at 907-08. Subsequently, OSHRC
continued administrative proceedings and imposed a civil sanction of $249,900 for the same
violations. Id. at 908. The Government's costs of investigating and prosecuting Healy
exceeded $490,000. Id. Healy appealed and claimed that the civil proceeding was a second
punishment in violation of doublejeopardy. Id. The court noted that OSHA did not provide
for the consideration of the Government's costs of investigation and prosecution in assessing
the sanction. Id. at 909. Further, the court observed that the Government was not the victim
in this case and therefore had no actual remediable damages. Id. at 909-10. Having made
these findings, the court held that double jeopardy barred the OSHRC sanction as a second
punishment even though it did not exceed the Government's costs of investigation and
prosecution. Id. at 910-12.
10. 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996).
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which held that a sanction not exceeding the Government's costs of investi-
gation and prosecution was not punishment." Moreover, the decision also
raised issues regarding whether a sanction is punitive if the regulatory statute
lacks consideration of the Government's expenses12 and whether a sanction
is punitive when the Government is not the victim." Presumably to resolve
the split between Hudson and Healy, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Hudson case.14 Although the Hudson and Healy
decisions created a split among the Tenth and Seventh Circuits," it is the
Healy decision that provided an in-depth discussion of the issues regarding
statutory allowance of the consideration of the Government's expenses and
the relevance of the Government's status as a victim. 6 Thus, this Note
focuses on the reasoning in Healy.
11. United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that sanc-
tions not exceeding government's damages were not punishment), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
1425 (1997). In Hudson, the court considered whether a sanction could be punishment when
it did not exceed the Government's costs, but the assessment of the sanction had punitive
purposes. Id. at 1028-29. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) assessed
civil money sanctions against Hudson and his codefendants for engaging in banking violations
that resulted in $900,000 in losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 1027-
28. The defendants made agreements with the OCC resulting in the payment of $16,600 by
Hudson and $15,000 by each of his codefendants. Id. at 1028. Subsequently, the three
defendants were indicted based on the same banking violations, and they moved to dismiss the
indictment based on a claim that double jeopardy barred a criminal proceeding on the banking
violations. Id. The court noted that Halper required the application of an objective test to
determine whether a sanction "bears a rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss" and is therefore remedial. Id. In this case, the court observed that
the Government's costs were $72,000, but the money sanctions assessed were only $44,000.
Id. at 1029. Further, the court stated that while a consideration of the subjective intent of the
OCC may have been punitive, Halper requires only an objective analysis of the civil money
sanction and its relation to the Government's losses. Id. at 1029-30. Because the sanctions
in this case were "rationally related to the government's damages," the court held that the civil
money sanctions did not constitute punishment. Id. at 1030.
12. See Healy, 96 F.3d at 909 (discussing lack of consideration of Government's costs
in OSHA).
13. See id. at 910 (developing distinction between remedial sanctions and compensatory
sanctions).
14. United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
1425 (1997).
15. See Summary of Orders, 65 U.S.L.W. 3684 (Apr. 15, 1997) (listing split between
Hudson and Healy as one of questions for Supreme Court to address in Hudson).
16. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
909-11 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing OSHA's lack of provision for consideration of govern-
ment's expenses and distinction between remedial and compensatory sanctions), petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299).
CIV_, MONEY SANCTIONS
This Note analyzes the issues raised by Healy with regard to the Halper
decision and the holdings of other courts. Part II gives an overview of the
use of civil money sanctions by agencies and the increased allowance of
both civil and criminal sanctions in regulatory legislation. 7 A review of the
basic doctrines that have developed regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause
and its protections follows in Part llI.A. is After discussing Halper,9 Part
IL.B examines the views of several commentators regarding the Halper
decision and discusses the impact of Halper on the use of civil money
sanctions.2 Part IV analyzes the three issues raised in Healy: (1) whether
lack of statutory consideration of the Government's expenses makes a
sanction punitive;2 (2) whether a sanction is punitive when the Government
is not the victim; ' and (3) whether a sanction that does not exceed the
Government's costs can be punitiveY This Note concludes that a lack of
statutory consideration of the Government's costs does not make a sanction
punitiveU and that a sanction may be remedial even if the Government is not
a victim.' Finally, this Note addresses the explicit split between Hudson and
Healy and argues that although in some cases a sanction that does not exceed
the Government's costs may be punitive, courts should generally follow the
rule of Hudson.'
17. See infra Part 11 (discussing use of civil money sanctions in regulatory legisla-
tion).
18. See infra Part III.A (providing overview of basic tenets of double jeopardy protec-
tion).
19. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Halper decision).
20. See infra Part mEr.B.2-4 (surveying commentaries on Halper, discussing impact of
Halper, and summarizing Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) and
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)).
21. See infra notes 177-254 and accompanying text (analyzing application of Halper with
respect to statutes providing no consideration of Government's costs).
22. See infra Part IV.B (scrutinizing Healy remedial/compensatory distinction).
23. See infra Part IV.C (examining Seventh Circuit's finding that sanction can be puni-
tive even when below Government's costs).
24. See infra Part IV.A.3-5 (arguing that statutes with no provision for Government's
costs can be remedial).
25. See infra Part IV.B (concluding that distinction between remedial and compensatory
sanctions is incorrect interpretation of Halper).
26. See infra notes 273-301 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between
Government's costs and amount of sanction and concluding Seventh Circuit should have
applied Hudson rule).
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II. The Use of Civil Money Sanctions and Criminal Sanctions
in Agency Enforcement
In recent years, the number of civil sanctions authorized in regulatory
legislation has grown.' Many regulatory statutes now contain both criminal
and civil sanctions for the same conduct and create a mixture of enforcement
remedies.2" This combination of civil and criminal sanctions has many
implications. Agencies now must choose whether to pursue either civil or
criminal sanctions or both,' and courts must struggle to decide what type of
protection to grant to defendants in each situation.3"
A. Agency Use of Civil Money Sanctions
Early regulatory statutes generally required agencies to rely on the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to institute civil proceedings. Usually, these
27. See PETER L. STRAUSs ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 687 (1995) (noting that Congress has authorized more agency
enforcement and that "the 1990s have seen reenergized enforcement activity at an unprece-
dented level"); Carolyn J. Buck & Dwight C. Smith E[, Enforcement of Net Worth Mainte-
nance Agreements and the Imposition of Civil Money Penalties, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 135, 148
(1995) (noting that "most... federal agencies ... have authority to impose civil money
penalties for violations of law or regulations"); Harvey J. Goldschmidt, Report in Support of
Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money
Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896, 896 (1973)
(noting "increased use of civil money penalties" by agencies); Laura J. Kerrigan et al.,
Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties: Civil Remedies, Alternatives,
Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 367, 387 (1993) (stating that
"[v]irtually every major administrative regulatory program authorized today contains some
type of civil monetary penalty sanction"); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1801, 1844 (1992)
(noting increase in agency ability to impose civil sanctions and increase in civil sanctions
included in agency legislation); Gary P. Naftalis et al., Private Civil Actions and Concurrent
or Subsequent Regulatory or Criminal Proceedings May 1993 Revision, C837 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
461, 463 (1993) (noting federal government's increased use of civil sanctions).
28. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Crim-
inal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1332 (1991) (discussing use of both civil and criminal penalties in
agency legislation and stating that this has resulted in "systematic blending of criminal and
civil remedies as part of a single law enforcement strategy").
29. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (stating that although double
jeopardy bars multiple punishments, Government can sanction defendant for single offense in
both criminal and civil proceeding); Goldschmidt, supra note 27, at 898 (stating that agencies
must decide what type(s) of sanctions to seek in each case).
30. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 397-417 (discussing difficulty of determining
what protections to afford defendants in civil proceedings and in parallel proceedings).
31. See Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by
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statutes contained penalties of a fixed amount.32 In recent years, however,
agency imposition of civil money sanctions has increased in scope.33 By
1979, more regulatory statutes included "variable-penalty" provisions that
gave agencies increased discretion to determine the amount of the sanction
in a particular case.' Moreover, the statutes increasingly permitted adminis-
trative assessment and imposition of the sanction, "subject only to limited
review of [the] action."35 This trend continued, and Congress persisted in
broadening the scope of agency power to impose civil sanctions against
violators of regulatory legislation.36
A pivotal case in civil money sanction jurisprudence, Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,37 addressed the issue
of whether the Seventh Amendment barred the administrative adjudication
of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) violations. 38 The Court held
that an administrative forum could impose civil sanctions without violating
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in some civil cases .3  However,
Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLum. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1979) (discussing limited
role of agency in prosecuting civil money penalty provisions in early agency statutes).
32. See id. at 1438-39 (observing that most older agency statutes contained "fixed mone-
tary penalt[ies]").
33. See id. at 1439-40 (discussing increase in agency ability to pursue and assess civil
money penalties).
34. See id. at 1439 (noting increase in "variable-penalty statutes").
35. Id. at 1440.
36. See Mann, supra note 27, at 1801 (discussing congressional enlargement of agency
power to impose civil sanctions).
37. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
38. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 449-50 (1977) (holding that Seventh Amendment did not prohibit administrative adjudica-
tion of OSHA violations without jury). In Atlas Roofing, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of administrative adjudication of OSHA violations in light of the Seventh
Amendment requirement of jury trials in some civil cases. Id. at 449. The Occupational
Safety and Health Agency (Agency) cited Atlas Roofing for violation of OSHA and held a
hearing before a panel of administrative judges. Id. at 447-48. The panel found that Atlas
Roofing violated OSHA and assessed a civil monetary penalty. Id. at 448. Atlas Roofing
appealed and claimed that OSHA enforcement procedures violated its Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial. Id. The Supreme Court noted that this case involved "public rights,"
which the Court defined as "rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact."
Id. at 450. The Court found that Congress could allow administrative finding of facts and
adjudication of such cases. Id. Further, the Court examined the history of the Seventh
Amendment and found that the Amendment did not require a jury to act as the factfinder in
all civil cases. Id. at 459-61. Thus, the Court held that Congress could create additional
rights to be enforced in administrative forums without violating the Seventh Amendment. Id.
at 461.
39. Id. at 450.
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the implications of Atlas Roofing extended beyond the Seventh Amendment
issue decided in the case. The Court upheld the use of civil money sanctions
designed to deter rather than just to compensate.4 Most notably, the deci-
sion allowed agencies to bypass the courtroom by administratively assessing
sanctions, thereby expanding agency enforcement power41 and broadening
congressional ability to delegate civil sanction assessment authority to
agencies.42 As a result, agencies now administratively impose many civil
sanctions. 43
In addition to the ease of imposing civil sanctions through administrative
proceedings,'M civil sanctions offer several advantages over criminal sanc-
tions.4' First, civil law offers numerous remedies in addition to monetary
fines, including "specific performance, injunctive relief, constructive trusts,
abatement of nuisances, and forfeitures. "46 Agencies can seek these reme-
dies in the criminal trial, in a separate civil proceeding, or in addition to
criminal sanctions for the same behavior.4
40. See Mann, supra note 27, at 1834-35 (stating that Atlas Roofing upheld use of
deterrent civil money sanctions).
41. See id. at 1830 (noting that body of cases, including Atlas Roofing, increased role
of agencies in enforcing laws by allowing administrative assessment of sanctions).
42. See id. at 1850 (stating that Atlas Roofing "left Congress free to extend the enforce-
ment powers of administrative agencies by granting them further penalty power"); see also
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 288-90 (1982) (discussing nondelegation doctrine as it applies to
delegation of judicial powers to agencies).
43. See Mann, supra note 27, at 1871 (stating that agencies may now impose civil
sanctions "through purely administrative assessment"); Adam G. Garson, Note, Administrative
Law - Consumer Product Safety Commission Lacks Authority to Administratively Assess Civil
Penalties Under Section 303(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act- Athlone Industries, Inc.
v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 707F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 57 TEMP. L.Q.
653, 653 (1984) (stating that congressional ability to delegate power to assess administratively
civil penalties "is beyond challenge"); see also Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and
Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV.
333, 398-99 (1982) (observing that Article III courts serve "supervisory role" in overseeing
administrative dispositions).
44. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing agency ability to impose
civil sanctions administratively).
45. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 374-79 (discussing advantages of imposing
sanction in civil proceeding rather than criminal trial). See generally Goldschmidt, supra note
27 (recommending increased agency use of civil sanctions and discussing advantages of agency
use of civil sanctions).
46. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1333 (discussing civil remedies offered by civil law);
Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 369 (discussing "vast array of penalties" civil law contains).
47. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1333, 1336-37 (discussing three alternative uses of civil
sanctions in conjunction with criminal sanctions).
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Moreover, civil sanctions are easier and cheaper for the Government to
pursue.4" The broad discovery permitted in civil trials tends to make them
more efficient than criminal trials.49 Although a party in a criminal trial
confronts "highly restricted" discovery rules, a party to a civil proceeding
may discover all relevant nonprivileged information.s Furthermore, the
procedural protections afforded the defendant in a civil trial are fewer than
those granted the criminal defendant. 1 The avoidance of these procedural
and constitutional protections makes the resolution of a civil proceeding
quicker and easier." Finally, the lower burden of proof in a civil trial 3
48. See id. at 1336 (discussing ease and efficiency of civil remedies as reasons for their
increased use); Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 369 (noting that efficiency is one reason to
choose civil sanctions rather than criminal sanctions); Mann, supra note 27, at 1798 (stating
that civil sanctions are "cheaper and more efficient than... criminal sanctions"); Note, A
Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Limita-
tions of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE L.J. 1446, 1450 (1982) (stating that "criminal
convictions of corporations [under OSHA] are slow, costly, and difficult to obtain").
49. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 374 (discussing discovery in civil actions).
50. See Pankaj Sinha, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1217, 1218 (1989) (discussing differences in discovery between criminal and civil proceed-
ings).
51. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1938) (stating that civil proceed-
ings, unlike criminal proceedings, do not require jury as factf'mder, allow directed verdicts
against defendant, have lower burden of proof than "beyond a reasonable doubt," allow
government appeals of verdicts, provide no right to confront witnesses, and require no protec-
tion for defendant from testifying); Goldschmidt, supra note 27, at 916 (stating that higher
procedural requirements of criminal proceedings require "agencies [to] assume substantial
(often unconsidered) additional burdens when they decide to sanction solely under the criminal
law"); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environ-
mentalLaw: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407, 2445 (1995) (stating
that procedural protections exist in criminal trials to protect defendant and to "preclude
consideration of unduly prejudicial information"); Mann supra note 27, at 1799 (observing that
defendants have fewer procedural protections in civil rather than criminal proceedings).
52. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1351 (noting that constitutional criminal protections "are
extremely costly and time consuming"); Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 374-75 (stating that
lower procedural protections in civil trials lead to quicker resolutions); see also Goldschmidt,
supra note 27, at 913 (observing common charge that sanctions are labeled "civil" in order to
avoid constitutional protections afforded to defendant in criminal trial); Mann, supra note 27,
at 1801 (stating that "[i]n many instances, the very motivation for the creation of civil punitive
sanctions was to avoid criminal procedural protection").
53. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that "Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"); Woodby v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1966) (observing that burden of proof in criminal
trials is proof of "essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt" and that burden in civil trials is
"mere preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485, 493 (1950) (observing that "lesser degree of proof [is] required in a civil
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enhances the Government's ability to prove wrongdoing and impose a
sanction.'
B. Agency Use of Criminal Sanctions
Criminal law proposes "to deter and punish socially deviant or harmful
behavior."55 To achieve these purposes, criminal law imposes a stigma on
defendants.5 6 In particular, a criminal conviction labels the defendant a
criminal57 and a "transgressor" against society." In the effort to punish
crime, criminal law also imposes imprisonment and even death as sanc-
tions. 9 However, these remedies are available only in the case of individual
defendants because no one can imprison" or l61 corporations.
case"); Helvering, 303 U.S. at 403 (stating that Government does not have to "prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt" in civil trials).
54. See Jonathan I. Chamey, The Needfor Constitutional Protections for Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478, 487-88 (1974) (stating that criminal trials
require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," while civil proceedings require that Government
prove its case by "a preponderance of the evidence"); Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 375
(listing "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in criminal trials as one of hurdles that
civil proceeding avoids); Mann, supra note 27, at 1813 (depicting in chart format differences
between civil and criminal proceedings, including differences in burdens of proof).
55. Cheh, supra note 28, at 1352-54 (discussing stigma of criminal sanctions).
56. See id. at 1352 (discussing stigma associated with criminal conviction and effects
on stigmatized individual); Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 379 (stating that stigma of
criminal conviction has deterrent effect); Lazarus, supra note 51, at 2442 (stating that criminal
conviction imposes "moral stigma"); Mann, supra note 27, at 1809 (stating that stigma is one
of remedies of criminal law).
57. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 379 (discussing labeling of defendant as
criminal and describing such labeling as "societal branding of an individual as a criminal").
58. Cheh, supra note 28, at 1352 (discussing stigma of criminal sanctions); see
Goldschmidt, supra note 27, at 898 (observing that criminal conviction "disgrace[s]" defen-
dant); Mann, supra note 27, at 1809 (noting that criminal convictions carry stigma).
59. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1355 (stating that "criminal law alone has the retributive
characteristics associated with lengthy incarceration or execution"); Lazarus, supra note 51,
at 2442 (stating that imprisonment and death penalty are "society's harshest sanctions" and are
penalties used in criminal law); Mann, supra note 27, at 1809 (calling imprisonment "distinc-
tive remedy of the criminal law").
60. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d
906, 908 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[clorporations cannot be imprisoned"), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299); Note, supra note 48, at 1453
(noting that remedy of imprisonment is not available in case of corporations); see also
Lazarus, supra note 51, at 2442 (stating that because "corporate entities . . . cannot be
incarcerated, stigma can be the only meaningful justification for the choice of criminal
prosecution rather than the less socially burdensome option of civil enforcement").
61. See Healy, 96 F.3d at 908 (observing that nearest equivalent of execution of
corporation is dissolution but noting that even dissolution "does not diminish the investors'
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Although legislatures originally inserted civil sanctions into regulatory
statutes as an alternative to criminal remedies,62 more agencies now resort
to civil sanctions rather than to criminal sanctions to punish violators. 63 One
reason for the increasing shift toward civil sanctions is the failure of criminal
sanctions to deter illegal activity. 64 For example, some commentators
describe the criminal sanctions of OSHA as limited and ineffective. 65 They
observe that the economic benefits of violating Occupational Safety and
Health Agency (Agency) regulations outweigh the low risk of criminal
conviction for such a violation. 6 Additionally, many OSHA violators are
corporations that the Agency cannot imprison6 and that are unlikely to suffer
anything more than economic stigma.' Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain
a criminal conviction against a corporation or its officers.69 However, the
ability to carry on the business; another corporation can be created at minimal cost").
62. See Mann, supra note 27, at 1853 (noting that civil penalties were originally
intended as alternative to criminal penalties in regulatory statutes).
63. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 432 (stating that "[d]uring recent years, there
has been a rapidly accelerating tendency for administrative and regulatory agencies to employ
civil remedies as a means of enforcement"); supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text
(discussing advantages of initiating civil proceeding rather than criminal proceeding); see also
Goldschridt, supra note 27, at 917 (recommending increased agency resort to civil sanctions
and stating that "[c]riminal enforcement of agency regulations has often proven costly and
ineffective, created undesirably wide areas of discretion, unnecessarily stigmatized defendants
who were in no sense morally reprehensible, and generally, interfered with the operation of
the criminal law").
64. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 377-78 (concluding that criminal sanctions
have often been ineffective).
65. See id. (discussing OSHA's criminal sanctions); Xavier K. McDonnell, Note,
Criminal Liability for Workplace Accidents, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 293, 317-20 (1989)
(discussing problems with criminal sanctions of OSHA). See generally Note, supra note 48.
66. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 377 (stating that economic benefits of violating
law may outweigh risk of criminal conviction).
67. See id. at 387 (noting that courts cannot imprison corporations).
68. See Note, supra note 48, at 1450-53 (discussing difficulty of obtaining criminal
conviction against corporation, problem of punishing corporation, and lack of stigma except
as it affects corporation's profits). Although not discussing corporations in particular, the
Administrative Conference noted that "criminal cases which invariably end in a fine (and not
imprisonment) are an expensive and inefficient exercise in futility, and needlessly debase what
should be the law's most potent sanctioning tool." Goldschmidt, supra note 27, at 918.
69. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 381-82 (discussing disinclination of juries to
convict officers of corporations and even stronger hesitancy to incarcerate convicted officers
in environmental enforcement area); McDonnell, supra note 65, at 318 (noting that criminal
sanctions of OSHA are not used often and imprisonment is rarely imposed on violators); Note,
supra note 48, at 1451-57 (discussing reluctance of juries to convict either corporations or
their officers for criminal OSHA violations).
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probability of Government success in a civil proceeding is higher,70 and the
threat of significant economic loss could have a greater deterrent effect than
the slight chance of criminal conviction.71
Despite the disadvantages of enforcing regulatory legislation through
criminal sanctions, reasons to impose criminal sanctions exist. For example,
the public increasingly encourages criminal prosecution of those who violate
environmental laws.' Commentators also acknowledge the following advan-
tages to criminal prosecution: (1) the perceived ineffectiveness of civil
money sanctions,73 (2) the deterrent effect of the threat of incarceration,74
and (3) the larger fines associated with criminal prosecutions.75
III. Double Jeopardy and Civil Money Sanctions
A. History and Overview of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.0 6 Although its
authors originally perhaps intended the Double Jeopardy Clause to apply
only to successive criminal prosecutions,7 a series of court decisions soon
70. See Charney, supra note 54, at 499 (stating that Government is more likely to pre-
vail in civil proceeding due not only to lower burden of proof, but also to fact that Govern-
ment is both plaintiff and author of statute being enforced); supra notes 48-54 and accompany-
ing text (describing lighter burden on Government in civil proceeding).
71. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 378 (stating that threat of economic loss in
civil proceeding may be greater deterrent than threat of criminal conviction); Note, supra note
48, at 1457 (arguing that large civil money fines may have strong deterrent effect).
72. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 380 (observing increased public support of
criminal prosecutions for those who violate environmental laws and predicting that this support
will continue).
73. See id. (stating that "[a]gency officials also feel that the mere imposition of fines is
largely ineffective"); Lazarus, supra note 51, at 2452 (stating that fines raise "cost of lawful
activity, giving those who violate the law a competitive advantage over those who comply");
McDonnell, supra note 65, at 319-20 (observing problems with civil fines under OSHA,
including lack of deterrence).
74. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 381 (discussing attempt by environmental
agencies to deter violators with threat of imprisonment); Lazarus, supra note 51, at 2512
(stating that some "monetary incentives otherwise favori] noncompliance," thus necessitating
use of criminal deterrents).
75. See Kerrigan et al., supra note 27, at 384 (explaining that fines in criminal trial may
be larger than in civil proceeding).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to the States. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969)
(holding Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to states). Double jeopardy also applies to corpo-
rate entities. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 574-76 (1977)
(applying double jeopardy protection to corporate defendant).
77. See Mack, supra note 1, at 221 (arguing that "historical development of the Double
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created a complicated body of law regarding the precise protections of the
Clause.7" Courts have noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
defendants from three abuses: (1) successive prosecution following acquittal,
(2) successive prosecution following conviction, and (3) multiple punish-
ments for one act.79
For double jeopardy to bar a second prosecution, jeopardy must attach
in the first proceeding.' In criminal cases, attachment occurs either upon
the impaneling and swearing in of the jury or at the start of the presentation
of evidence to the judge in a bench trial.8 ' The point at which jeopardy
attaches in a civil proceeding is less clear.8 Support exists for the proposi-
tion that jeopardy attaches upon the assessment of the civil penalty 3 and for
the argument that jeopardy does not attach until the Government collects the
penalty.'
However, certain exceptions exist to the rule that double jeopardy
precludes a second prosecution after jeopardy attaches in the first prosecu-
tion.' For example, double jeopardy does not preclude subsequent prosecu-
tion after the judge properly declares a mistrial,s6 after the defendant success-
Jeopardy Clause also supports the thesis that double jeopardy applies only in the criminal
context and only to multiple prosecutions, not multiple punishments"). But cf. JAY A. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEvELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 32 (1969) (observ-
ing that Framers "hastily adopted" Double Jeopardy Clause after little discussion of what they
intended it to mean).
78. See William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REv.
411,414-17 (1993) (discussing addition of Double Jeopardy Clause into Bill of Rights and con-
temporary understandings of Clause at time of its adoption); Mack, supra note 1, at 221-35
(discussing history of Double Jeopardy Clause and subsequent relevant judicial interpretations).
79. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (listing protections of Double Jeopardy Clause).
80. See James A. Bell, IV & Todd Richman, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: Double Jeopardy, 84 GEO. L.J. 1076, 1079-80 (1996) (discussing attachment
requirement).
81. See id. at 1079 (describing points at which attachment occurs).
82. See Brief for the Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions
for Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 34 n.15, Thermal Science, Inc. v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 4:96CV02282-CAS (E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 20, 1996) [herein-
after NRC Brief] (stating that "it is not clear at what precise point 'jeopardy' attaches in a civil
proceeding").
83. See Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 298-99 (Ind. 1995) (finding that jeopardy
attached upon assessment of civil sanction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
84. See Bell & Richman, supra note 80, at 1079-80 (stating that attachment occurs when
Government collects civil sanction).
85. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980) (stating that "Court's
cases show that even the protection against retrial is not absolute").
86. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323 (1984) (finding that Double
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fully appeals the verdict and the court grants a new trial," or when the
second prosecution is by a different sovereign.8
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against successive
prosecutions" for a single offense. ' The Supreme Court held in Block-
burger v. United States91 that in the same proceeding the Government could
punish a defendant for a single act under more than one statute provided
each statute contained at least one element different from the other.92 The
Jeopardy did not bar retrial following proper declaration of mistrial); Bell & Richman, supra
note 80, at 1080-81 (discussing allowance of second prosecution when mistrial is declared due
to "trial judge's finding that the jury is deadlocked, biased, or unduly influenced").
87. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (stating that "[ilt has long been
settled, however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause's general prohibition against successive
prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in
getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some
error in the proceedings leading to conviction"); NEML P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE PosT-INvEsTIGATIvE PROCESS 673-74 (1995) (discussing
appropriateness of retrial following reversal of conviction due to trial error). But see Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that reversal based on insufficiency of
evidence bars retrial of defendant).
88. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-89 (1995) (discussing dual sovereignty
doctrine, which allows for prosecution of same act by two sovereigns when act breaks law of
both); Bell & Richman, supra note 80, at 1100-03 (discussing "dual sovereignty doctrine,"
which allows separate prosecutions by both state and federal governments); McAninch, supra
note 78, at 424-27 (describing dual sovereignty doctrine, when the doctrine applies, and some
government policies dealing with the doctrine).
89. Many commentators use the expression "multiple prosecutions" when referring to
the double jeopardy protection against two consecutive prosecutions for the same offense.
Because in a single trial a defendant may be prosecuted on multiple charges involving the same
offense, the author believes that the term "successive prosecutions" more accurately describes
the protection, and thus that term is used in this Note. However, when commentators used
the term "multiple prosecutions," the original text has been preserved.
90. See Eric Loeb et al., Project: Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994: Double Jeopardy, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1037, 1052 (1995) (discussing double jeopardy bar on multiple prosecutions).
91. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
92. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding that Double
Jeopardy Clause did not bar conviction under two sections of Narcotics Act for one offense
where each section required proof of unique element). In Blockburger, the Supreme Court
considered whether the conviction of a defendant based on two sales of illegal drugs that
resulted in three convictions under the Harrison Narcotic Act violated double jeopardy. Id.
at 300-01. The defendant claimed that double jeopardy barred convicting him separately for
each sale because the two sales were part of a continuous act. Id. at 301. In addition, the
defendant claimed that his separate convictions for violations of two sections of the Narcotics
Act constituted multiple punishment. Id. As to the first claim, the Court found that the two
sales did not constitute a continuous act because the Narcotics Act punished each sale of illegal
drugs, the first sale was completed before the second sale occurred, and the second sale was
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Court also uses this test to determine if a second prosecution aims at punish-
ing the same offense as the first and, therefore, constitutes a successive
prosecution in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.9' Likewise, after
prosecution to verdict for a crime (e.g., felony murder) that includes a lesser
offense (e.g., robbery), jeopardy bars a subsequent prosecution for the lesser
offense.9
The Double Jeopardy Clause also prohibits the imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense.' This situation arises when the Govern-
ment attempts to impose multiple punishments for a single offense in one
criminal trial.' In this instance, double jeopardy precludes the multiple
punishments unless the legislature expressed the intent to provide more than
one punishment for the offense.' Multiple punishment questions also arise
in the context of consecutive criminal and civil proceedings.9" The resolu-
motivated by a new impulse. Id. at 301-03. The Court held that in addition to looking at the
nature of the acts to determine whether to treat multiple acts as a continuing offense, courts
should also look to the intent of the legislature. Id. at 303. Where, as here, the legislature
intended to punish each act separately, the court should uphold multiple convictions. Id. As
to the defendant's second claim, the Court noted that each section of the Narcotics Act at issue
constituted a separate offense requiring proof of different elements. Id. at 303-04. The Court
announced that the test to determine whether a single act is punishable under more than one
statutory provision is whether each statute requires proof of a different element. Id. at 304.
Because the statutory provisions in the Narcotics Act met this test, the Court held that double
jeopardy did not bar Blockburger's convictions for the same offense under two separate
provisions of the Narcotics Act. Id.
93. See Loeb et al., supra note 90, at 1052 (discussing use of Blockburger to prohibit
successive prosecution for same offense).
94. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 (1977) (holding that when defendant had
been convicted of felony murder committed during robbery with firearms, second prosecution
for robbery with firearms was jeopardy barred). The Court stated: "When... conviction
of a greater crime... cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime... the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one."
Id.; see also Loeb et al., supra note 90, at 1053-54 (discussing bar of second prosecution for
lesser included offenses).
95. See Loeb et al., supra note 90, at 1056-57 (describing multiple punishment protec-
tion).
96. See COHEN & HALL, supra note 87, at 660 (discussing more than one punishment
in same trial and Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983)); Loeb et al., supra note 90, at
1056-57 (discussing imposition of multiple punishments in one criminal proceeding).
97. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (finding that if two statutes
authorized punishments for same offense, court may impose cumulative punishment regardless
of fact that statutes prohibit same conduct as described in Blockburger); Loeb et al., supra
note 90, at 1056-57 (stating that "[m]ultiple charges and punishments in a single prosecution
will not violate double jeopardy if the legislature intended to impose cumulative punish-
ments").
98. See COHEN & HALL, supra note 87, at 664-66 (discussing multiple punishment issue
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tion of these situations depends on the definition of "punishment"" and is the
focus of Part IIB and Part IV of this Note.
Courts and commentators articulate several policy reasons for double
jeopardy protection. These justifications include keeping verdicts final,
serving justice, and providing closure for defendants. 1° In addition, double
jeopardy protections constrain the ability of prosecutors to abuse their
power. °1 Finally, the Supreme Court discussed "psychological security" as
a reason justifying double jeopardy protections." The Court stated that
successive prosecutions subject the defendant to "embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compel[ ] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty."'03
B. Complicating the Complicated. Civil Sanctions as Punishment
Barred by Double Jeopardy
1. United States v. Halper
Originally, most courts and commentators did not interpret the Double
Jeopardy Clause as a bar to civil sanctions following criminal punishment
for the same offense.1°4 As cases arose involving civil money sanctions
and forfeiture actions by the Government following criminal convictions for
the same offense, the Supreme Court analyzed the claims by examining
whether or not the civil sanction constituted a criminal punishment. 5 In
arising in context of subsequent civil proceedings).
99. See id. at 664-65 (asking "what is punishment?" and discussing United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) and Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994), discussed at infra Part III.B.4.a).
100. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions,
63 TENN. L. REv. 793, 842-43 (1996) (discussing reasons for existence of double jeopardy
protections); David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishments Under the Double
Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1993) (dis-
cussing policies behind double jeopardy protections).
101. See Henning, supra note 100, at 843 (stating that double jeopardy prevents prosecu-
torial abuse by barring "repeated trials and excessive punishments").
102. SIGLER, supra note 77, at 156 (discussing purposes of double jeopardy protections).
103. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).
104. See Henning, supra note 3, at 44 (stating that double jeopardy did not apply to civil
proceedings before Halper); Mack, supra note 1, at 232 (quoting Justice Brandeis in Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938), who stated that "double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same
offense").
105. See Mack, supra note 1, at 228-35 (discussing Court's analysis of early cases
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making such determinations, the Court generally deferred to legislative
intent.106
The Supreme Court altered the analysis of these cases"° in United States
v. Halper. In Halper, the Court examined the issue of whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause precluded a civil money sanction that far exceeded the costs
to the government when imposed after a criminal conviction and punish-
ment. °0 Halper submitted sixty-five false Medicare reimbursement claims
to the Government totaling $585."° The Government criminally tried and
convicted Halper under the criminal provision of the False Claims Act, and
he received a two-year prison sentence and a $5,000 fine."0 Subsequently,
the Government brought a claim against Halper under the civil provisions of
the False Claims Act,"' which authorized a penalty of $2,000 for each false
claim filed plus double the amount of the Government's losses.' The issue
before the Court was whether the civil penalties authorized in the False
Claims Act constituted punishment and, therefore, were barred by double
jeopardy. 113
Departing from prior holdings that deferred to the legislature and the
language of the statute in making such determinations,"" the Court answered
in the affirmative." 5 Rejecting statutory labels of "criminal" or "civil" as
involving claims that double jeopardy barred civil actions by government). For an overview
of the Supreme Court's holding regarding the rights afforded defendants in cases involving puni-
tive civil sanctions, see Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing
Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 517 (1997).
106. See Mack, supra note 1, at 235-37 (stating that even though Justices did not always
agree on result in specific case, they usually agreed that question was one of legislative intent).
Mack also states: "Until 1989, the case law held clearly and almost without exception that
double jeopardy did not restrict the power of the Legislature to determine what punishments
to impose and even to impose cumulative punishments if it so chose. The job of the courts
was to determine what the Legislature intended." Id. at 235; see also Eads, supra note 6, at
930-31 (stating that for half century before Halper, Court used "statutory construction test"
to decide if sanction was criminal or civil and noting that Court had previously deferred
greatly to legislative intent).
107. See Eads, supra note 6, at 930 (stating that "[in Halper, however, the Court altered
its form of analysis and discarded the statutory construction approach").
108. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989).
109. Id. at 437.
110. Id.
111. 31 U.S.C.. § 3729(a) (1994).
112. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
113. See Mack, supra note 1, at 240 (discussing Halper and issue before Court).
114. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (describing Court's deferral to legis-
lative intent to determine nature of sanction prior to Halper).
115. See Nancy J. King, Proportioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive
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determinative, the Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not
be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent
or retribution.""1 6 The Court stated that it would look at each case to deter-
mine whether the goals being served were remedial or punitive.117 When the
goals of a statute in a particular case were punitive, the Court would con-
sider the sanction as punishment barred by double jeopardy."' Because the
statute in this case authorized punishment of $130,000 and the Government
only suffered actual losses of $585 and expenses of $16,000,119 the Court
held that the gross disparity between the costs to the Government and the
fine was sufficient to characterize the fine as a second punishment prohibited
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 20
The Court clarified the new standard by stating that a civil penalty was
remedial if it bore a "rational relation to the goal of compensating the Gov-
ernment for its loss."' 2' However, the Court allowed the Government a fair
margin to demonstrate its losses.' The Court concluded its opinion by
emphasizing that the new rule was "for the rare case" and deferred to trial
courts to make future determinations as to when the sanction went beyond
remedial reimbursement to punishment.' Finally, the Court noted that the
Government could still seek both civil and criminal penalties in one proceed-
ing and that the ruling did not affect civil actions brought by private parties. 24
2. Analyzing Halper
Considerable analysis of Halper's reasoning followed the decision.
Commentators criticized the Court's reliance on the multiple punishments
and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 121-22 (stating that Halper decision "flout[s]
legislative will"); Thomas W. Robertson, Note, Two Views of Austin v. United States: Is a
Civil Forfeiture Action to Collect "Proceeds," Pursuant to Title 21 U.S. C. § 881 (A) (6) Still
Exempt From the Protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause?, 23 AM. J. CRaM. L. 431, 439-
40 (1996) (observing that "Halper decision disturbed a seemingly stable jurisprudence by
greatly reducing deference to Congressional labels").
116. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-49 (1989).
117. Id. at 448.
118. Id. at 448-49.
119. Id. at 439.
120. Id. at 452.
121. Id. at 449.
122. See id. (noting that determining Government's losses "inevitably involves an element
of rough justice").
123. Id. at 449-50.
124. Id. at 450-5 1.
1200
CiVIL MONEY SANCTIONS
prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause rather than the successive prose-
cutions prong." Because of this, some commentators noted the potential
application of Halper to bar a criminal prosecution following the impo-
sition of a civil penalty," and some lower courts faced such "reverse-
Halper" claims. 27 Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
125. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1254, 1266-67 (discussing flaw in Halper's "exclusive
focus upon the multiple punishments prong of double jeopardy"); Eads, supra note 6, at 932,
953 (stating that Halper focused on multiple punishment prong and that it is that prong that
applies in context of civil sanctions sought by government); Robert S. Pasley, Double
Jeopardy and Civil Money Penalties, 114 BANKING L.J. 4, 4 (1997) (stating that Supreme
Court focused on multiple punishment protection); Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality
of State Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 843, 867 (1993)
(arguing that Court should have based Halper on multiple prosecutions prong rather than
multiple punishments prong). Bt see Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper,
Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112, 134 (1991) (agreeing with Halper Court that appropriate analysis in case was
multiple punishment).
126. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating that same constitutional reasoning that precludes civil punishment
following criminal punishment would preclude criminal punishment following civil punish-
ment); Cox, supra note 6, at 1250 (discussing possibility of using Halper decision to bar
criminal proceeding that follows civil proceeding); Rudstein, supra note 100, at 601-16
(stating that under multiple punishment analysis of Halper, double jeopardy bars criminal
punishment following civil "punishment"). Professor Rudstein discusses some possibilities
for avoiding this result, which he views as "inconsistent with Halper" because it denies the
Government the ability to seek the full civil and criminal penalties authorized. Id. at 602-03.
However, even if the tactics to avoid a multiple punishment bar fail, Rudstein argues that there
would not be a bar on the criminal prosecution because the civil proceeding would not have
subjected the defendant to jeopardy. Id. at 614-15. Thus, if the criminal trial results in
acquittal, there is no double jeopardy issue because there is no additional punishment. Id. If
the trial ends in conviction, the Halper holding would bar a second punishment, but the
defendant would still suffer the consequences attendant a criminal conviction (i.e., loss of right
to vote), thereby making the prosecution worthwhile to the Government. Id. at 615-16. But
see Kirgis, supra note 125, at 867 (discussing problems in constitutional analysis in Halper
that could lead to criminal prosecution being barred due to prior civil punishment). Mr.
Kirgis, writing before the Kurth Ranch decision, argues that it would be an "absurd" result
if, for example, the imposition of a tax penalty were to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution,
and urges the Court to treat Halper cases as successive prosecution cases rather than as
multiple punishment cases in order to avoid such a result. Id.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993) (addressing
claim that civil sanction by prison officials barred subsequent criminal trial); King, supra note
115, at 123-24, 123 n.70 (discussing popularity of "reverse-Halper" claim and lower court
cases in which courts used Halper to bar criminal prosecution after civil penalty); Edward F.
Novak, Parallel Proceedings and Double Jeopardy Implications, 28 ARIz. ATr'Y 21, 22
(1991) (discussing use of double jeopardy defense to avoid criminal prosecution subsequent
to civil penalties). Mr. Novak argues that if double jeopardy applies to subsequent civil pro-
ceedings, it should also apply to subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. Further, he notes that
most courts facing this issue have agreed with this analysis. Id.; see also Andrew Z. Glick-
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issue,'28 many defendants have raised this defense and some lower courts
have ruled in their favor.
129
Commentators also claim that the Court's focus on the multiple punish-
ments prong allows punitive civil sanctions following a criminal acquittal. 30
In Thermal Science, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"'
a case pending in a federal district court, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) argued that Halper only barred punishment in a civil proceeding
when it followed conviction and punishment in a criminal trial.1 12 Thus,
NRC contended that Halper allowed civil punishment of a defendant if the
prior criminal trial ended in acquittal because the civil punishment would be
the only punishment imposed.' Likewise, one commentator argued that
man, Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punish-
ment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. Rnv. 1251,
1251 (1990) (noting that defendants "rarely" used double jeopardy as defense to criminal trial
following civil sanction before Halper).
128. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1249-50 (stating that Court has never decided case with
reverse facts of Halper).
129. See King, supra note 115, at 123-24, 123 n.70 (discussing popularity of "reverse-
Halper" claims and lower court cases in which courts used Halper to bar criminal prosecution
after civil penalty).
130. See James Dever, Double Jeopardy, False Claims, and United States v. Halper, 20
PUB. CONT. L.J. 56, 78-79 (1990) (noting that Government often pursues strategy of seeking
criminal conviction first and then seeking civil sanctions if criminal proceeding results in
acquittal). This discussion seems to lend support for the contention that it is the belief that
even civil punitive sanctions following an acquittal would not raise any double jeopardy
concerns. Id.
131. Thermal Science, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No.
4:96CV02282-CAS (E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 20, 1996).
132. See NRC Brief, supra note 82, at 3 (arguing that Halper bars subsequent civil
punishments when prior criminal proceeding also punished defendant).
133. See id.; see also United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
493-94 (1950) (stating that "lilt has been repeatedly held that though the civil suit is bottomed
on the same facts, it is not barred by the prior judgment of acquittal in the criminal case").
While lending support to the NRC's argument, the Real Estate Boards Court did not address
the issue of punitive civil sanctions following criminal acquittal. But see David T. Buente Jr.
et al., The "Civil" Implications of Environmental Crimes, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,589, 10,595-96 (1993) (discussing effect of Halper on civil sanctions following criminal
acquittal); Cox, supra note 6, at 1301 (stating that "any punishment sought in a fast track civil
action will foreclose further criminal prosecution for the same offense"). Buente et al.
contend that while
an acquittal typically has not been held to bar the government from bringing a
subsequent civil case for the same conduct, the logic of Halper may be employed
to prevent the government at least from pursuing penalties in the civil case that




Halper, while barring civil punishment following criminal conviction, did
not preclude civil punishment following criminal acquittal. 3 4 Moreover, if
the Government sought both the civil and criminal sanctions in one proceed-
ing, Halper would not apply at all, and the court would instead examine
legislative intent. 3 Thus, some commentators argue that the defendant
acquitted in the criminal trial and then subject to civil sanctions 36 and the
defendant that receives both types of sanctions in one proceeding both
receive less protection than the defendant convicted in the criminal trial.'37
Despite the confusion over the Court's explicit use of the multiple
punishments prong in the Halper analysis, it is clear that the Court necessar-
ily considered both the multiple punishments and successive prosecution
prongs. 3 1 The Halper Court acknowledged that the Halper case would have
no double jeopardy problem if multiple punishments was the only issue when
it stated that the imposition of both the civil and criminal punishments in a
single proceeding would avoid a double jeopardy problem.'39 The Supreme
Court previously held that double jeopardy did not bar multiple punishment
Buente et al., supra, at 10,596. However, although Buente et al. argue that Halper may prevent
civil punishment following a criminal acquittal, it is notable that they characterize the problem
as one of successive prosecution, which is not how the Halper Court characterized the double
jeopardy issue. See supra Part 1l.B.2 (noting Halper's basis in multiple punishments prong).
134. See Henning, supra note 3, at 51 (stating that Halper's reasoning leads to conclusion
that double jeopardy does not bar civil punishment following criminal acquittal).
135. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (authorizing multiple punish-
ments in single proceeding when intended by legislature); Jahncke, supra note 125, at 142-43
(observing that because Hunter applies to cases of multiple punishments imposed in one pro-
ceeding, courts should analyze double jeopardy claims following imposition of both civil and
criminal sanctions in one proceeding under legislative intent analysis of Hunter rather than
Halper).
136. See Henning, supra note 3, at 51 (stating that "Halper has been criticized for giving
greater protection to convicted criminals than to those found not guilty of a criminal viola-
tion").
137. See Jahncke, supra note 125, at 140-41 (describing better protections afforded to
defendants facing two proceedings than those facing multiple punishments in one proceeding).
138. See Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and
Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-United States v.
Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REv. 437, 453 (1990) (stating that "real concern
in Halper was not multiple punishments: it was multiple prosecutions"). Hall also argues that
the reason the Court chose to ground the language of the decision in the multiple punishments
prong rather than in the successive prosecutions prong was because it "probably preferred
multiple punishments analysis over multiple prosecutions analysis because of the courts' long-
standing approval of parallel criminal and civil proceedings, and the courts' belief in the right
of the government to be compensated for its losses." Id. at 453-54.
139. See id. at 453 (supporting argument that Court was really concerned with multiple
prosecutions through Court's authorization of both criminal and civil penalties in one proceed-
ing).
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of a defendant for a single act in one proceeding when the legislature in-
tended imposition of both punishments."4° If the only issue in Halper was
multiple punishments, then no problem would exist with the civil proceeding
because Congress clearly intended for multiple punishments.14' Halper only
makes sense when successive prosecution considerations become part of the
analysis. Because the Government sought to punish Halper in successive
proceedings rather than in a single trial, a double jeopardy issue emerged. 42
Thus, an interpretation of the Court's holding as prohibiting multiple punish-
ments in successive prosecutions presents a more plausible and logical
understanding of the decision than an interpretation grounded solely in the
multiple punishments prong. 43 Under the former reading, a civil proceeding
following a criminal proceeding, ending either with conviction or acquittal,
constitutes a prosecution to the extent that it seeks to punish the defendant.1"
Thus, a punitive civil proceeding bars a subsequent criminal proceeding,
while a remedial civil proceeding does not. " Also, a criminal acquittal bars
a subsequent civil proceeding to the extent that the civil proceeding seeks to
punish the defendant.'46
140. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69 (holding that double jeopardy bars imposition of
multiple punishments in single proceeding unless legislature provided for multiple punish-
ments).
141. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1989) (noting existence of both
criminal and civil sanctions for same conduct in False Claims Act).
142. See Henning, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that "question of whether a civil sanction
constitutes a criminal penalty can arise whenever the government brings a succeeding action,
either criminal or civil").
143. See Hall, supra note 138, at 454 (advocating use of successive prosecution analysis
to limit civil sanctions against convicted defendant to remedial level); see also Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955, 1958 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple punishments). Although Justice Scalia
joined in the unanimous Halper opinion, he re-examined the issue of whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited multiple punishments in Kurth Ranch and concluded that it did not.
Id. at 1958. He argued instead that the Clause protects against only multiple prosecutions.
Id. at 1955.
144. See Hall, supra note 138, at 454 (arguing that when court subjects convicted
defendant to subsequent punitive civil penalty, better analysis is that Government is attempting
successive prosecution barred by double jeopardy and stating that Court should recognize that
"imposition of a sanction beyond compensation would undermine the civil nature of the
proceeding and transform the proceeding into criminal prosecution").
145. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2161 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that jebpardy bar involving punitive civil proceeding and
criminal trial "cannot depend on the order in which they are filed").
146. See id. (stating that holdings in Halper and Kurth Ranch "necessarily rested on the
assumption that the civil proceeding in which the second punishment was imposed was a
'jeopardy'"). Thus, Stevens' statement evidences the view that a jeopardy bar becomes an
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3. Importance and Impact of Halper
Halper has many implications for agency imposition of civil money
sanctions. 47 First, Halper may prevent agencies from enforcing both the
criminal and civil sanctions authorized and intended by the legislature.
1 48
Regardless of legislative intent to create a civil sanction, a court may deter-
mine that such a sanction is punishment, and double jeopardy may bar its
imposition.1 49 Thus, the role of the judiciary in determining the applicability
of civil sanctions will increase, ' and courts may overrule legislative intent.
Addressing the concern that its decision would prevent the Government
from seeking the full sanctions allowed by law,1 2 the Halper Court sug-
gested that the Government seek only a punitive civil sanction and no crimi-
nal penalty,153 seek both criminal and civil sanctions in the same pro-
ceeding, 54 or have a private individual bring the civil claim.' 55 However,
issue to the extent that a civil proceeding seeks to punish the defendant. Stevens further argues
that unless the civil proceeding constitutes jeopardy, "there would have been no basis for
concluding that the defendants had been 'twice put in jeopardy' as the text of the Clause
forbids." Id.; see Henning, supra note 3, at 52 (stating that "the successive prosecution
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to cases brought after convictions or
acquittals, so a defendant's protection would not depend on the outcome of the prior action").
147. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1237-38 (noting that Halper's holding may have effects
in forfeiture and administrative proceedings and criminal prosecutions, and stating that
"Halper's implications are far-reaching"); Eads, supra note 6, at 958 (stating that Halper will
affect significant number of cases); Novak, supra note 127, at 21 (stating that Halper has "far-
reaching double jeopardy implications").
148. See Rudstein, supra note 100, at 602-16 (discussing difficulties in enforcing both
criminal and civil remedies since Halper).
149. See Eads, supra note 6, at 956 (observing that Halper increases ability of courts to
review imposition of civil money sanctions and that there is no assurance "that a legislature's
desire to create a civil penalty will prevail over a judge's determination that punishment -
with constitutional implications - results from the sanction as applied").
150. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1299-1300 (stating that courts will need to review
proceedings to see if jeopardy has attached and what type of sanctions are allowable); Eads,
supra note 6, at 964-65 (stating that Halper will result in greater appeal and reversal of awards
to Government in administrative hearings); Hall, supra note 138, at 438 (stating that Halper
"expands the courts' role in double jeopardy analysis").
151. See Eads, supra note 6, at 952, 956 (stating that Halper allows for increased judicial
review of civil sanctions and provides for judges to override legislative intent to create civil
sanction).
152. See Dever, supra note 130, at 77-85 (describing three suggestions offered by Court
and their application in context of False Claims Act).
153. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 450-51 (noting that Halper decision did not prevent individuals from
bringing civil claims); see also Dellorfano v. Lansing, No. CIV.A. 96-0092, 1996 WL
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these tactics may not be useful to the Government.1 16 Although choosing to
pursue only one type of sanction, criminal or civil, may seem an easy
solution, this approach may create problems due to the difficulty in review-
ing grand jury materials for a civil trial, the coordination between agencies
and the DOJ, 157 and the threat that the court will stay one of the proceed-
ings. 5 Moreover, differences in discovery rules, procedural rules, and
burdens of proof in criminal and civil trials make the imposition of both civil
and criminal sanctions in a single trial difficult and undesirable."5 9
As a result of the potential double jeopardy problems in the imposition
of sanctions, agencies must coordinate their efforts more closely with prose-
cutors. " In many cases, one individual or corporation may be the subject
of both a criminal and a civil investigation.' Because the second proceed-
ing will likely raise some double jeopardy concerns, the agencies and prose-
278804, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1996) (observing that double jeopardy is issue only when
Government brings both actions, not when private individuals bring actions). This Note does
not address qui tam actions and their attendant analytical difficulties. For a discussion of the
impact of Halper on qui tam actions, see Dever, supra note 130, at 79-85; Hall, supra note
138, at 450-52.
156. See Dever, supra note 130, at 78-79 (discussing difficulties with combining both
proceedings).
157. See Glickman, supra note 127, at 1280-81 (arguing that Government may not always
be able to select easily only one type of sanction).
158. See id. (discussing threat of stay); Shahrzad Heyat et al., Ninth Survey of White
Collar Crime: Environmental Crimes, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 475, 487 (1994) (stating that
"[d]ouble jeopardy claims are a popular, albeit unsuccessful, means of staying criminal actions
when the government proceeds contemporaneously with civil and criminal actions"). Thus,
it seems that a court is more likely to stay the civil proceeding than the criminal proceeding..
Id. at 487-88.
159. See Dever, supra note 130, at 78-79 (arguing that combining both claims in one
proceeding would make it more difficult for Government to prove civil claim, due to confusion
caused by conflicting procedural rules of criminal and civil proceedings); Eads, supra note 6,
at 978-83 (discussing problems with seeking both criminal and civil remedies in one trial and
concluding that courts will be unlikely to join both claims without exigent circumstances
beyond desire to avoid double jeopardy problems); Glickman, supra note 127, at 1280
(observing that procedural differences between civil and criminal trials create significant
difficulty in combining trials and "greatly reduce the likelihood of their occurrence").
160. See Dever, supra note 130, at 86 (noting need for coordination efforts in False
Claim Act investigations and prosecutions); Jeffrey M. Geller, Note & Comment, The Impact
of Recent Double Jeopardy Decisions on Federal Agencies, 10 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 327, 349
(1996) (stating that Halper necessitated greater coordination between agencies and prosecu-
tors); Glickman, supra note 127, at 1285 (stating that minimal change agencies must make in
wake of Halper is to coordinate effort when seeking both criminal and civil sanctions).
161. See Buente et al., supra note 133, at 10,589 (stating that "[m]ost federal environ-
mental statutes allow the federal government to conduct both civil and criminal investigations,
initiate both civil and criminal proceedings, and seek both civil and criminal sanctions").
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cutors must communicate in order to determine which sanctions are more
important and should be sought first.162
4. Relevant Supreme Court Cases After Halper: Kurth Ranch and Ursery
a. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch
The 1989 Halper decision was not the Supreme Court's last word on
civil sanctions and double jeopardy. In 1994, the Court decided Department
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch.' In Kurth Ranch, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a state tax levied on those found in posses-
sion of illegal drugs.'" The Court noted the language in Halper that the
label given to a statute is not determinative in deciding whether or not it
constitutes a punishment and found that taxes can be subject to double
jeopardy claims. " Notably, the Court stated that taxes can be high and have
a deterrent purpose without being considered punishment.' 6 However,
162. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1300 (discussing importance of communication between
agencies and prosecutors to determine most effective prosecution strategy).
163. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
164. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (holding state tax on
illegal possession of drugs following criminal drug conviction violative of Double Jeopardy
Clause). In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Montana
state tax assessment on the possession of illegal drugs subsequent to criminal conviction for
the same offense. Id. at 769. The Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act (Act) authorized the
Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) to assess a tax for the storage of illegal drugs
following the imposition of criminal liability. Id. at 770. The Kurth family was arrested for
growing and selling marijuana on their farm, and each defendant eventually pled guilty to drug
charges and was sentenced. Id. at 771-72. The state also commenced and settled a civil
forfeiture action against the defendants. Id. at 772. Subsequently, the DOR assessed a tax
on the illegal drugs. Id. at 773. The Kurths challenged this tax assessment in bankruptcy
proceedings and claimed that under Halper, the tax violated double jeopardy. Id. After
reviewing its decision in Halper, the Court found that a tax could be subject to the require-
ments of double jeopardy. Id. at 779-80. The Court stated that taxes, while generally
intended to raise revenue, could have punishment as their primary purpose. Id. The Court
noted that while the mere existence of deterrence and a high rate did not lead to the conclusion
that the tax was a punishment, the DOR assessed the tax only after the taxpayer had been
arrested and assessed the tax on property no longer in the possession of the defendants. Id.
at 780-82. Due to these characteristics of the tax, the Court found that it was punishment.
Id. at 783. The Court also found the Halper analysis of the costs to the government of investiga-
tion and prosecution were inapplicable in the case of a tax. Id. at 784. Therefore, the Court
held that the tax was a second punishment precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
165. See id. at 779 (stating that Court's past recognition that taxes could be punishment
coupled "with Halper's unequivocal statement that labels do not control in a double jeopardy
inquiry, indicates that a tax is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply because it
is a tax").
166. See id. at 780-81 (discussing use of high taxes to deter certain activities deemed
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because the Montana tax in question imposed a tax on goods no longer in the
defendants' possession167 only after a criminal act,16 1 the Court concluded
that the tax was a punishment. 16 Because the defendants previously pleaded
guilty to criminal charges based on the same conduct,1 70 the tax constituted
a second punishment precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.171 Thus,
Kurth Ranch extended the double jeopardy protection to the imposition of
taxes. 172
b. United States v. Ursery
More recently, the Court further clarified the double jeopardy standards
applicable to forfeitures and monetary sanctions in United States v. Ursery."
In Ursery, the Court held that in rem civil forfeiture proceedings were not
punishment and, therefore, were not subject to double jeopardy claims. 74
undesirable and finding that such use of taxes does not constitute punishment). As an exam-
ple, the Court notes the use of taxes on cigarettes in order to deter smoking. Id. The Court
distinguishes this type of tax from the tax in this case by pointing to the benefits and legality
of the production of cigarettes, which contrasts with the illegality of the production of
marijuana. Id. at 781-82.
167. See id. at 783 (discussing fact that marijuana was out of defendants' possession when
taxed).
168. See id. at 781-82 (discussing fact that tax followed defendants' illegal activity).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 772 (stating that all defendants arranged plea agreements).
171. See id. at 784 (concluding that tax was "functional equivalent of a successive
criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offence'").
172. See id. at 778-79 (stating that Court had not previously applied Double Jeopardy
Clause to tax cases).
173. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
174. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996) (holding that "in rem civil
forfeitures [in this case] are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause"). In Ursery, the Supreme Court of the United States considered double
jeopardy claims involving in rem civil forfeiture proceedings following and preceding criminal
convictions. Id. at 2138-39. The Court considered decisions of the Sixth Circuit, which
involved a defendant convicted of production and distribution of marijuana, and the Ninth
Circuit, which involved a defendant convicted of money laundering. Id. at 2138-39. In the
Sixth Circuit, the Government had brought an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding prior to the
defendant's criminal conviction and obtained a settlement of $13,250. Id. In the Ninth
Circuit, the Government obtained a criminal conviction before securing judgment in their in
rem civil forfeiture proceeding. Id. The Court noted that these cases raised the issue of what
constitutes multiple punishments proscribed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 2139-40.
The Court then discussed the history of the use of in rem civil forfeiture actions and noted that
it had "consistently]" ruled that in rem forfeitures were remedial and not punitive. Id. at
2140-42. After discussing its holdings in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, the Court
announced that the Halper analysis was limited to civil penalties and was not applicable to civil
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Importantly, Ursery limited the application of Halper. In the opinion, the
Court referred to Halper's focus on civil penalties as "narrow.' t75  The
Court drew a bright line in double jeopardy jurisprudence by finding the
Halper decision to be inapplicable in the case of in rem civil forfeitures.
176
IV. Analysis of Controversy Among the Circuits:
When Is a Sanction Punishment?
Halper left unresolved the question of when a civil money sanction
constitutes punishment." The recent United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decision in S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, which found an administrative OSHA sanction
to be punishment,' raised three significant issues regarding when a civil
money sanction constitutes punishment: (1) whether an agency may receive
its costs of investigation and prosecution when the regulatory statute does not
provide for consideration of the Government's costs in assessing the civil
sanction; (2) whether a sanction can be remedial when the Government is
forfeitures. Id. at 2142-45. Thus, the Court returned to the analysis previously used in civil
forfeiture cases under the Double Jeopardy Clause and examined the intent of Congress and
the punitive nature of the forfeitures in this case. Id. at 2147. In doing so, the Court found
that Congress intended the forfeitures in these two cases to be civil and that the forfeitures
were not "so punitive in form as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the
contrary." Id. at 2147-48. Therefore, the Court held that the forfeitures in question were not
punishment and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 2148.
175. Id. at 2144-45 (discussing Halper's development out of cases like United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), and Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
148 (1956), and noting that Halper's holding was limited to civil penalties).
176. See id. at 2145-47 (stating that "i]t is difficult to see how the rule of Halper could
be applied to a civil forfeiture" and observing that Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin did not
change earlier rulings regarding civil forfeitures and double jeopardy).
177. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting that Halper left "it to lower courts to determine at what particular dollar
level the civil fine exceeded the Government's 'legitimate nonpunitive governmental objec-
tives' and thus became a penalty"); see also Cox, supra note 6, at 1275 (stating that Halper
gives "no precise formula" to help courts determine when penalty becomes punishment); Kerri-
gan et al., supra note 27, at 373 (discussing lack of guidance Halper gives to lower courts to
decide when sanction is remedial or punitive). However, Cox argues that although there will
be some penalties that "serve only punitive purposes" and that should be barred, the penalties
that fall in the "gray areas" should not be considered punishment. Cox, supra note 6, at 1275.
178. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comn'n, 96 F.3d 906,
911-12 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that monetary sanction imposed by OSHRC was punishment
barred by double jeopardy), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997)
(No. 96-1299).
179. See id. at 909 (discussing lack of consideration of Government's expenses in
OSHA).
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not a victim;18° and (3) whether a civil sanction that does not exceed the
Government's costs of investigation and prosecution can be punishment."'
This Part analyzes these three issues with regard to the holdings of the
Supreme Court and the decisions of various circuits and concludes that the
Seventh Circuit interpreted Halper too broadly in deciding that the sanction
in Healy was punishment.
A. Statutes Without Compensatory Considerations:
Automatically Punitive?
1. Facts of Healy and Findings Regarding OSHA
In Healy, S.A. Healy Company (Healy), the defendant, committed over
sixty violations of OSHA standards.1, These violations caused an explosion
that killed three Healy employees." The Agency Secretary investigated the
violations, found them to be "wilful," and recommended the maximum
sanctions available under the instance-by-instance assessment provisions of
OSHA.1" Following the Agency investigation, the DOJ initiated criminal
proceedings." The trial ended in conviction, and the court fined Healy
$750,000.186 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC) resumed administrative proceedings based on the same viola-
tions. 8 7 After rejecting Healy's claim that the second proceeding violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause, OSHRC fined Healy $249,900, or $5,100 per
violation.1 88
Healy appealed, and the Seventh Circuit accepted Healy's argument that
the OSHRC proceeding violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the
monetary sanctions imposed amounted to "punishment."8 9 To support its
holding that double jeopardy precluded the administrative sanction imposed
on Healy, the Seventh Circuit relied on the text of OSHAJ 9 The court
noted that none of the various elements listed in OSHA for consideration
180. See id. at 909-10 (discussing relevance of remedial/compensatory distinction).
181. See id. at 910-11 (refusing to find sanction remedial just because it does not exceed
Government's costs).
182. Id. at 907.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 908.
186. Id. at 907-08.
187. Id. at 908.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 912.
190. See id. at 909 (discussing OSHA). The court did not examine amendments to the
OSHA following 1988, the year of the salient events. Id.
1210
CIVIL MONEY SANCTIONS
when assessing sanctions against violators of the Act included the costs
incurred by the Government. 9 The court distinguished OSHA from the
False Claims Act (at issue in Halper) and noted that the False Claims Act
provided for consideration of the Government's costs in assessing the fine,
but that OSHA did not.19 Moreover, the Court noted that the fines under
OSHA were higher than those authorized by the False Claims Act.1 93
2. WRW Corp.: No Consideration of Costs but Still Remedial
The Healy court refused to follow the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. WRW Corp., 94
which arose under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (Mine Safety
Act) 95 and addressed a similar set of facts and a similar double jeopardy
issue. " Two employees died after WRW, the defendant corporation,
violated standards of the Mine Safety Act." The Government won a civil
191. Id. The relevant portion of OSHA states:
The Commission shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this
section, giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with
respect to the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of
the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous viola-
tions.
29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1994).
192. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
909 C7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-
1299).
193. Id.
194. 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1993).
195. 30 U.S.C. § 820 (1994).
196. United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that
sanction issued under Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (Mine Safety Act) after criminal
conviction was remedial because it related to Government's costs). In WRW Corp., the Sixth
Circuit considered the validity of a civil sanction issued after criminal conviction for violations
of the Mine Safety Act. Id. at 140. WRW Corp. committed violations of the Mine Safety
Act. Id. Two employees of WRW died as a result, and the Government assessed civil
sanctions. Id. After obtaining prison sentences against the three sole shareholders of WRW,
the Government sought to collect the civil sanctions. Id. WRW claimed that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precluded the collection proceeding. Id. The court examined the Mine
Safety Act and found it to have remedial goals and to be remedial as applied to the defendant
corporation. Id. at 140-41. The court interpreted Halper narrowly and stated that it required
a clear showing that the sanction was punitive before it would find the sanction to be punish-
ment. Id. at 141. In this case, the court found that the Mine Safety Act was remedial because
it "promot[ed] mine safety." Id. at 141-42. The court also found that the amount of the sanc-
tion related to the expenses incurred by the Government. Id. at 142. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the sanction was not punishment. Id.
197. Id. at 140.
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assessment against WRW in the amount of $90,350.198 Following a criminal
conviction for violations of the Mine Safety Act, a trial court fined and
sentenced the only three shareholders of WRW to prison.'9 9 The Govern-
ment then sought to collect the civil assessment, and the defendants claimed
that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the colection proceeding." The
portion of the Mine Safety Act at issue was similar to the portion of OSHA
at issue in Healy.2 1 Also, the defendants in WRW Corp., like the defendant
in Healy, claimed that the sanction was punitive because the factors listed for
consideration in assessing a penalty under the Mine Safety Act evidenced a
deterrent and retributive purpose.' The Sixth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment.' Although recognizing that the factors listed in the Mine Safety Act
could be punitive as applied, the court concluded that the remedial purpose
of the sanction in this instance was to "promot[e] mine safety. '"2 After
finding the purpose of the Mine Safety Act to be remedial both in general
and as applied to WRW, the court examined the amount of the sanction. 2°s
The court found that the amount in question was not so high that it lacked a
rational relation to the Government's investigation and prosecution costs and
constituted a punishment under Halper.
The Healy court refused to follow the WRW Corp. decision and criti-
cized the Sixth Circuit both for relying on a set of pre-Halper factors and for




201. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
910 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "Federal Mine Safety and Health Act is similar in design and
purpose to the Occupational Safety and Health Act"), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W.
3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299). The analogous portion of the Mine Safety Act
states:
In assessing civil monetary penalties, the Commission shall consider the operator's
history of previous violations, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the
business of the operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect on
the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the
demonstrated good faith of the person charged in attempting to achieve rapid
compliance after notification of a violation.
30 U.S.C. § 820(i) (1994).
202. United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1993).
203. Id. at 141-42.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 142.
207. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
910 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-
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Sixth Circuit relied on an earlier set of factors to make its determination, 20'
these factors were not so divorced from those advocated in Halper to render
the WRW Corp. analysis incorrect. The WRW Corp. court carefully consid-
ered the issue of whether the sanction served the goals of retribution and
deterrence or was remedial,' which was the approach advocated in
Halper.21° Halper prohibits the imposition of a civil sanction on a convicted
defendant "to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be character-
ized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. ,211 Thus, although
the WRW Corp. court incorrectly labeled its inquiry, it applied the correct
analysis under Halper by examining the purpose of the statute and finding
that the Mine Safety Act could appropriately be described as remedial and
then examining the sanction in the particular case to determine that it was
also remedial. 2
3. Examining the Purpose of the Sanction in Healy
Similarly, an argument exists that the Seventh Circuit could fairly
describe the goals of the sanction in Healy, both in general and as applied to
Healy, as remedial. The Supreme Court noted that OSHA has a "remedial
orientation"13 and a "remedial scheme ''214 and commented that "safety legis-
lation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose."
21 1
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit itself previously found that OSHA is a
1299). The Healy court criticized WRW Corp.'s reliance on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963), a case involving double jeopardy and civil penalties that preceded
Halper. Id.
208. United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 141-42 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying
Kennedy-Martinez factors to Mine Safety Act to determine if purpose of Act was remedial).
209. The WRW Corp. court noted Halper's warning that "the same civil penalty provision
may be remedial in general but punitive as applied in an individual case." WRW Corp., 986
F.2d at 140. Although using outdated factors in making its determination, the court addressed
this Halper consideration and concluded "that imposing a civil penalty for health and safety
violations which varies in amount based upon the severity of the violation and the operator's
attempts to come into immediate compliance may as readily be ascribed to the remedial pur-
pose of promoting mine safety." Id. at 141-42.
210. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (finding that courts should
determine purpose of statute when trying to discern whether sanction is punitive or remedial).
211. Id. at 448-49.
212. See WRW Corp., 986 F.2d at 141-42 (finding general and specific purpose of statute
to be remedial); see also Pasley, supra note 125, at 18 (stating that WRW Corp. court applied
Halper's "balancing test" to determine that sanction was remedial).
213. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12 (1980).
214. Id. at 13.
215. Id.
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remedial statute.216
The Healy court, however, rejected the above argument and found the
sanction to be punitive.2"' The court properly concluded that, after determin-
ing the purpose of the statute, the court should examine the sanction issued
in the specific instance." 8 However, the court improperly concluded that the
sanction, as applied in this case, was punitive. The test given in Halper to
determine if a specific sanction is punitive as applied required examination
of whether the sanction bore a "rational relation" to the costs borne by the
Government as a result of the illegal activity. 219 The Healy court found that
the sanction was punitive based on the lack of consideration of the Govern-
ment's losses in OSHA.m However, such a finding contradicts the holdings
of other circuits and the language of Halper.221
4. Sanctions With No Consideration of the Government's Costs
The Healy court concluded that the sanction assessed against the defen-
dant served no remedial goalsm but sought to deter.' Thus, the court found
in this instance that OSHRC's means of achieving the remedial goals of
216. See Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1324-25 (7th
Cir. 1980) (stating that OSHA "is a broad remedial measure designed to ensure that employees
are provided with safe workplaces").
217. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
911 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-
1299).
218. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (discussing process to
determine whether sanction is punishment). First, the Court acknowledged the validity of
examining the legislative intent and purpose of the statute. Id. at 447. But the Court then
acknowledged that even a civil sanction may be punishment and held that "the determination
whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particu-
larized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said
to serve." Id. at 448; see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2156 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "a fixed penalty that would
otherwise serve remedial ends could still punish the defendant if the imposed amount was out
of all proportion to the damage done").
219. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
220. Healy, 96 F.3d at 909.
221. See Pasley, supra note 125, at 14-24 (discussing cases from various United States
Courts of Appeals that have interpreted Halper narrowly when determining whether sanction
is remedial).
222. Healy, 96 F.3d at 911. The court noted that the sanction was not remedial because
the statute did not provide for a consideration of the Government's costs and it did not serve
any other remedial goals but observed that debarring Healy to prevent future violations would




OSHA were punitive.224 However, other circuits have not taken this ap-
proach when faced with similar claims and statutes that did not provide for
the consideration of the costs to the Government.' For example, the WRW
Corp. court did not consider the lack of a provision in the Mine Safety Act
for the Government's costs to be a problem and simply applied the rational
relation test.' Moreover, in addressing a double jeopardy claim involving
a civil money sanction assessed under a banking statute, 7 the Hudson court
found that the sanction was remedial despite the absence of consideration of
the Government's losses in the relevant portion of the legislation.' Finally,
in United States v. McClinton, 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit allowed the criminal indictment of a defendant following a civil
money sanction under the Tariff Act of 19303' that also did not address the
Government's damages?' Thus, three other circuits have addressed statutes
224. Id.
225. See generally United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that
fixed civil sanctions under Tariff Act did not violate double jeopardy); United States v.
Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding consideration of Government's costs in
assessing civil sanction under statute that did not mention such considerations), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997); United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1993) (allowing
consideration of Government's costs despite Mine Safety Act's omission of these costs as
criteria).
226. See generally WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138.
227. See National Banks Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1994). This section of the statute lists
three tiers under which the government may assess sanctions. Id. The first tier has the lowest
sanctions and provides that violators "forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $5,000
for each day during which the violation continues." Id. § 93(b)(1). The National Banks Act
does not consider a set of variables in assessing this fine, but fixes it with apparently no regard
to the costs sustained by the Government in prosecuting and investigating the violator. Id.
228. See generally Hudson, 92 F.3d at 1026 (omitting any discussion of double jeopardy
issue due to statute's lack of consideration of costs to Government). But see Summary of
Orders, 65 U.S.L.W. 3684 (Apr. 15, 1997) (listing issues Supreme Court would consider in
Hudson and including question of whether sanction can be remedial if the statute does not
provide for consideration of Government's costs).
229. 98 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1996).
230. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1459 (1994).
231. United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
customs sanctions imposed on defendants did not bar subsequent criminal trial). In McClinton,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether double jeopardy barred a criminal prosecution based on
the same violation when the defendants had been assessed civil sanctions under the Tariff Act
of 1930. Id. at 1200. A search of the defendants upon their entry into the United States
revealed that the defendants were in possession of marijuana. Id. Because neither defendant
had disclosed his possession of the marijuana, customs officials assessed fines under 19
U.S.C. § 1459. Id. Subsequently, the Government sought to try defendants criminally for
the marijuana possession. Id. The defendants claimed that the sanction by the customs offi-
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that fail to consider the Government's losses and found that this fact did not
preclude sanctions assessed under the statutes from being remedial. 2
The Supreme Court should adopt the approach of Hudson, WRW Corp.,
and McClinton for two reasons. First, the Halper Court stated that the rule
it announced was for the "rare case." 3 If other courts follow the holding
of Healy, presumably OSHRC could never pursue a civil money sanction
following the defendant's criminal conviction." The practical result of this
approach would be to limit the Agency to a choice of only one of the reme-
dies available in OSHA.' In addition, the three other statutes examined in
cials barred the criminal prosecution. Id. The court found that both sanctions, one of $500
and one of $1,000, were too small to constitute punishment. Id. at 1201. Because of the
small amount of the fines, the court found that the sanctions fell within the guidelines of
Halper. Id. The court noted Halper's language that its holding only rarely would be used to
find a civil sanction to be punishment. Id. The court held that the fines imposed on the
defendants in this case were not so large as to become punishment that would bar a criminal
prosecution on the same charges. Id. at 1202. The statute in this case provides for fixed
penalties for failure to report and present all possessions for inspection by customs officials
but does not address the costs to the government. 19 U.S.C. § 1459(f); see also United States
v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding $500 sanction under Tariff Act of 1930
to be remedial).
232. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (discussing decisions of three circuits
finding similar sanctions to be remedial).
233. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (stating that "[w]hat we announce
now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty
provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly dispropor-
tionate to the damages he has caused").
234. This conclusion is based on Healy's findings that the sanction was punishment
because OSHA does not provide for the consideration of the Government's expenses, S.A.
Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir.
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299), and
because the Government was not a victim in this case, id. at 910. Presumably, these two
factors will be present in most of the cases that will arise under the OSHA in the future. See
also Eads, supra note 6, at 964-65 (discussing possible impact of Halper on civil sanctions
imposed under environmental legislation that levies sanctions based on "particular acts" rather
than on Government's loss). Eads, writing shortly after the Halper decision, noted that the
impact on the civil enforcement of these types of statutes would be the greatest. Id. However,
she believed that the impact would be that appellate courts would remand a greater number
of cases for an accounting of the Government's losses rather than bar the sanction completely.
Id.
235. See United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
disciplinary action by prison officials was not punishment that barred subsequent criminal trial
for same acts). In support of this conclusion, the court noted that if the court labeled the
disciplinary proceeding punishment, then the Government would have to choose only one of
its remedies because "[sleeking disciplinary sanctions and criminal penalties in a single pro-
ceeding is not feasible." Id. A similar argument can be made here in light of the discussion
at supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text (describing difficulties in implementing alterna-
tives to concurrent civil and criminal penalties as suggested by Halper court) that combining
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this Part that do not provide for the consideration of the Government's costs
would have the same limitation. 36 Thus, the Healy holding would preclude
civil money sanctions following a criminal conviction under at least these
four statutes.237 Because the Halper Court emphasized that its holding was
for the rare case, it presumably did not intend the holding to have such a
broad and sweeping effect. 8
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Halper, as well as other
circuit court cases, suggests that even if the Administrative Law Judge (AL)
does not consider the Government's costs in assessing the civil money
sanction, the sanction is remedial if it relates to the Government's costs of
investigation and prosecution. 9 In his Halper concurrence, Justice Kennedy
stated that the test established in Halper was objective and was not dependent
on the precise factors that the assessor of the sanction considered.' Addi-
tionally, lower courts have upheld sanctions related to the Government's
expenses even when the AUL never considered the Government's costs in
assessing the sanction.24 This approach is the more appropriate one for the
a trial for civil and criminal sanctions is not practical. But see Halper, 490 U.S. at 450
(noting that Halper decision does not "prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining
both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the
same proceeding"); Healy, 96 F.3d at 911 (observing that "[i]mposed in a single proceeding,
the criminal and administrative fines would not have been problematic").
236. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act, National Banks Act, and Tariff Act of 1930). These three statutes do not provide
for the consideration of the Government's costs.
237. See Glickmnan, supra note 127, at 1278 (noting that "[w]hile some civil penalties are
related to the amount of the Government's losses or costs of investigation and prosecution, few
penalty provisions are tailored so as to recover only the damages and costs incurred by the
federal Government"). This suggests that the impact of following the Healy rationale could
be even greater than demonstrated in this Note. See also NRC Brief, supra note 82, at 46
n.18 (stating that Healy court posits "unduly restrictive view of the government's right to
pursue civil penalties").
238. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989) (stating that Court did "not
consider our ruling far reaching or disruptive of the Government's need to combat fraud");
Glickman, supra note 127, at 1268 (arguing that Halper Court intended narrow interpretation
and that "Court's expansive characterization of what might constitute punishment for purposes
of multiple punishment analysis was not intended to profoundly constrain Government prose-
cutions").
239. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 452-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing limited nature
of Halper's holding and objectiveness of standard announced).
240. Id. at 453 (stating that Halper "constitutes an objective rule that is grounded in the
nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case... [and] does not authorize courts
to undertake a broad inquiry into the subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a
given judicial proceeding").
241. See, e.g., United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting
that AUL did not consider Government's costs, but finding that it did "not alter the objective
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Healy case and other cases arising under OSHA. Although OSHA lists four
factors that the ALJ must consider in assessing the sanction,24 2 it is not an
exclusive list that forbids any consideration of the costs to the Govern-
ment.23 Because the statute does not preclude consideration of the costs of
investigation and prosecution, the AIJ's failure to consider these costs
should not be dispositive, and courts should look only at the relationship
between the Government's costs and the sanction. The sanction may be
"fairly characterized as remedial"2" and should not be characterized as a
punishment.
5. Deterrence as Motive in Regulatory Statutes
The Healy court also found that the OSHA sanction in this case was
punitive because OSHRC imposed it for deterrent purposes.24 The Third
Circuit addressed the problem of how to evaluate statutes that contain some
element of deterrence in addition to remedial purposes and developed an
approach that reconciles the existence of both purposes in a remedial
statute.' The Third Circuit clarified the seemingly inconsistent language in
Halper regarding whether a sanction must have only remedial purposes for
a court to consider it remedial. 7 The Third Circuit concluded that a sanc-
conclusion by the trial court that the penalty assessed is rationally related to the goal of making
the Government whole"); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
that although ALT did not take Government's expenses into account, this "does not imply that
the fine is not related to the government's loss"). Healy distinguished Furlett, noting that the
defendant in Furlet conceded that sanctions rationally related to the Government's expenses
would not be punishment, while Healy contested this point. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299).
242. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666G) (1994) (listing four
factors for OSHRC to consider in assessing sanction).
243. See id. (stating that OSHRC should give "due consideration to the appropriateness
of the penalty with respect to" four factors listed, but failing to preclude OSHRC from
considering any other factors); see also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
797, 786 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (stating that "compensation for the Govern-
ment's loss is the avowed purpose of a civil penalty statute").
244. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
245. See Healy, 96 F.3d at 910 (discussing deterrence as motive for imposition of civil
fine in Healy case).
246. See Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1255 n.16 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing
method of determining when sanction is remedial).
247. Id. The following passage in Halper created this confusion:
From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand
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tion is punishment to the extent that its purpose can only be retribution or
deterrence.' Under this interpretation, a sanction is not punishment, even
if it partially serves to deter, if a court can fairly describe it as remedial.249
Instead, a sanction is punishment to the extent that it serves only punitive
purposes (i.e., retribution or deterrence)."
This approach to statutes containing some punitive aspect, especially
those that contain some deterrent purpose, is the most appropriate. As
courts and commentators have noticed, most statutes contain at least some
deterrent purpose25' Thus, if Halper precluded the imposition of civil
sanctions with any deterrent purpose, its holding would be extremely far-
reaching. However, instead of interpreting Halper this broadly, several
courts examined statutes with some punitive purpose and found that the
sanction, as applied in the case, could be described as remedial .1 2 This
the term. We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to
an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
248. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1255 n.16.
249. Id. at 1255. The court explained that "[t]he threshold question is thus whether a
remedial purpose can explain the sanction. Only if the remedial purpose is insufficient to
justify the measure, and one must resort also to retributive or deterrent justifications, does the
measure become punitive." Id.
250. Id. The court also defines retribution, deterrence, and remedial as follows:
Retribution is vengeance for its own sake. It does not seek to affect future conduct
or solve any problem except realizing 'justice.' Deterrent measures serve as a
threat of negative repercussions to discourage people from engaging in certain
behavior. Remedial measures, on the other hand, seek to solve a problem, for
instance by removing the likely perpetrators of future corruption instead of threat-
ening them, or compensating the government for costs incurred.
Id. (citations omitted).
251. See Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[gleneral
deterrence is the foremost and overriding goal of all laws, both civil and criminal, and tran-
scends the nature of any sanction"); Pasley, supra note 125, at 11 (stating that "[w]ith regard
to civil money penalties ... it would be difficult, if not impossible, not to find some degree
of deterrence, if not retribution as well, in the penalty").
252. See, e.g., Bae, 44 F.3d at 494 (finding that purpose of statute was partly to deter
future violations, but concluding that provision did not "serve solely punitive goals"); SEC v.
Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that "disgorgement is not a second
punishment because it is not exacted solely for deterrence or retribution"); United States v.
Walker, 940 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1991) (observing that part of purpose of Tariff Act
of 1930 was to punish, but holding that court could describe statute as remedial as applied to
defendant).
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approach is in accord with that developed in Halper, which stated that a
sanction was punishment when it could "not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."" 3 Thus, when a sanction
may equitably be described as remedial, the sanction is not punishment, and
double jeopardy should not bar the imposition of the sanction. As demon-
strated above, the sanction in Healy could be described as remedial.5 4
Consequently, any retributive or deterrent purposes also found in the sanc-
tion should not compel a finding that the sanction is punitive.
B. Remedial vs. Compensatory: A Distinction Without a Difference?
The Healy decision also raised the issue of whether a sanction is punish-
ment when the Government is not a victim. In Healy, the Seventh Circuit
considered it important that the victims of Healy's violations were the
families of the dead employees and not the Government. 5 The court
distinguished this situation from Halper, in which the Government was the
victim of Halper's false claims. 6 According to the court, at least part of the
sanctions levied in Halper remedied the harm the Government suffered as a
victim, while none of the sanctions levied against Healy had such a justifica-
tion due to the fact that the Government was not a victim.' The court thus
distinguished remedial sanctions, which benefit the victims of the wrongful
action, from compensatory sanctions, which reimburse the Government's
expenses." Here, the families of the dead employees received none of the
money collected by OSHRC and benefitted only in terms of the deterrent
effect that the sanction may have on Healy and other employersY 9
Thus, Healy created a new distinction under Halper between remedial
and compensatory sanctions and raised the question of whether it should
matter that the Government is not the victim when determining the purpose
of a sanction. Other courts have addressed situations in which the Govern-
ment was not a victim and have found the sanctions to be remedial or have
not even addressed the issue of whether the Government's status as a victim
253. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
254. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (describing remedial nature of
OSHA).
255. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
909-10 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-
1299).
256. Id. at 910.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 910-11.
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is important.m An examination of the language of Halper and the holdings
of other courts leads to the conclusion that the Healy court was mistaken in
applying this new distinction.
The most persuasive evidence that Healy's distinction between remedial
and compensatory sanctions is fallacious is the language in Halper. Halper
indicated that remedial and compensatory sanctions were the same, rather
than distinct and separate.61 In several places in the Halper opinion, the
Court referred to compensation of the Government as the defining character-
istic of a remedial sanction. 2 Moreover, when the Court defined punish-
ment, it did not include in this definition compensation to the Government
when the Government was not the victim.6' Because the Court used the
term "compensate" in its definition of remedial sanctions at least four times'
and did not distinguish cases when the Government was not the victim when
defining punishment,' the conclusion follows that the Court considered
compensation of the Government, even when not a victim, to be remedial.
Many lower courts following Halper, including Hudson, have also taken this
approach.'6 Thus, the distinction between remedial and compensatory
260. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding disgorgement
order to be remedial despite fact that Government was not victim of defendant's actions);
United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 140-42 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding sanction under
Mine Safety Act remedial even though victims of defendants' violations were relatives of
killed employees).
261. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 445-450 (1989) (using terms "compen-
sate" and "remedial" interchangeably and failing to distinguish between terms).
262. United States v. Haper, 490 U.S. 435, 445 (1989) (stating that "Government...
may demand compensation"); id. at 449 (discussing how to determine if sanction is remedial
by referring to "process of affixing a sanction that compensates the Government for all its
costs" and stating rule that sanction is punishment only when it "bears no rational relation to
the goal of compensating the Government for its loss"); id. at 450 (stating that trial court
should determine amount that will "ensur[e] both that the Government is fully compensated
for the costs of corruption and that ... the defendant is protected from a sanction so dispro-
portionate to the damages caused that it constitutes a second punishment" (emphasis added)).
263. Id. at 448 (stating that "[w]e have recognized in other contexts that punishment
serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence").
264. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (listing four uses of "compensate" in
Halper's discussion of remedial sanctions).
265. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing Court's lack of reference in
definition of punitive sanction to compensation of non-victimized Government).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "[u]nder the objective test outlined in Halper, a particular sanction is not punishment
when it bears a rational relation to the goals of compensating the government for its loss"),
cert. granted, 117 5. Ct. 1425 (1997); United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1115 (2nd Cir.
1995) (finding that Government could be compensated although not victim); United States v.
WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "the fact that the penalty does
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sanctions, with the latter constituting punishment, appears to be a creation
of the Seventh Circuit and not a correct interpretation of Halper.
Courts should also reject the Healy distinction between remedial and
compensatory because this distinction would have an enormous impact on
Government enforcement of regulatory legislation. For example, the pur-
poses of OSHA include protection of the workforce and insurance of safe
working conditions. 27 Government action effectuates these purposes, and,
therefore, an injured employee does not have a cause of action under
OSHA. 268  In most, if not all, cases arising under OSHA, the victim is an
employee who is subjected to a dangerous working environment, injured, or
dlled.2 9 By not allowing the Government to enforce the civil provisions of
OSHA on the victim-employee's behalf, a holding distinguishing between
remedial and compensatory awards would have the result of taking away
from both the Government and the employees the Government seeks to
protect the civil remedies available under OSHA. This result would affect
the Government's enforcement of OSHA and the enforcement of other
regulatory legislation.2 0 Once again, the Halper Court stressed that its
holding was for the "rare case271 and not meant to be "far-reaching." 2
Given the limiting language of Halper, it is unlikely that the Court intended
to bar all civil proceedings subsequent to criminal proceedings when the
Government was not the victim.
not compensate the Government for precise actual losses does not preclude it from being
remedial in nature"); United States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 134 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that
rule of Halper "focuses on whether the civil sanction sought after the imposition of a criminal
penalty bears a rational relationship to the goal of compensating the government for its loss").
267. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1980) (stating policy of OSHA
as protecting nation's labor force); Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156,
1168 (3d Cir. 1992) (Nygaard, J., concurring) (stating that "OSHA's overriding purpose is
to prevent workplace injuries").
268. See Ries, 960 F.2d at 1168 (Nygaard, I., concurring) (noting that OSHA is "en-
forceable by administrative civil and criminal penalties," but that OSHA "does not provide
remedies to injured employees").
269. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 444-46 (1977) (observing that OSHA intended to protect employees from "unsafe or
unhealthy working conditions" and intended to provide sanctions when violations resulted in
death of employee). Thus, none of these purposes relate to injury to the Government but only
to harm to the worker.
270. For example, the Mine Safety Act is similar to OSHA and protects mine workers.
See supra note 201.
271. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
272. Id. at 450; see also supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing limiting
language in text of Halper).
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C. The Explicit Split with Hudson: If the Sanction Does Not Exceed
the Government's Costs, Can It Be Punishment?
The Healy court found the $249,900 administrative sanction to be
punishment despite the fact that the costs incurred by the Government in
investigating and prosecuting Healy in both proceedings exceeded
$490,000.273 In so doing, the court stated that it would not follow the
decision of the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hudson, which held that a
sanction not exceeding the Government's costs of investigation and prosecu-
tion was not punishment. 4 In Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) assessed civil money sanctions against the defendants for
banking violations resulting in $900,000 in losses to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and costs to the Government of $72,000.275
The OCC assessed civil sanctions against the three defendants totaling
$44,000.276 Although the AIJ in the OCC proceeding did not consider the
Government's costs in assessing the sanctions, 2 7 the court held that the
sanctions were "rationally related to the government's damages" and, there-
fore, were not punishment.278 Thus, the Hudson court interpreted Halper as
positing an objective test requiring a study of the relationship between the
Government's costs and the sanction imposed,279 rather than the subjective
motives of the sanction assessed. m Under the Hudson court's analysis, the
sanction in Healy was not a punishment because it did not exceed the Gov-
ernment's costs of investigation and prosecution and could accordingly be
described as rationally related to the Government's losses."
The Healy court's conclusion that the sanction was punishment even
though it did not exceed the Government's costs necessarily flowed from its
273. S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
908 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-
1299).
274. United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that sanc-
tions not exceeding Government's costs were remedial), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997).
275. Id. at 1027-28.
276. Id. at 1028.
277. Id. at 1029.
278. Id. at 1030.
279. Id. at 1028.
280. Id. at 1029-30.
281. In fact, when Healy argued that jeopardy barred the administrative proceeding, the
AIJ found that "the administrative fine was not punishment because it is 'rationally related
to the Government's costs of investigation and prosecution.'" S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906, 908 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299).
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findings that the OSHA sanction, as applied in this case, was punitive
because it did not provide for the consideration of the Government's costs'
and the Government was not a victim in this case.m The prior determination
that the sanction had punitive purposes compelled the conclusion that the
sanction was punitive despite its relation to the Government's costs. How-
ever, given the above discussion demonstrating that the Seventh Circuit was
incorrect in making its findings regarding the punitive purpose of the sanc-
tion,2" it follows that its final conclusion is likewise incorrect.
Generally, the test formulated in Halper and applied by lower courts
involves an examination of the sanction to determine if it can be explained
as remedial.? s The Halper Court noted that a sanction becomes punishment
when a sanction is so high that it no longer is rationally related to the Gov-
ernment's costs.m Thus, the test is a simple one - compare the amount of
the Government's damages to the amount of the sanction.' The Halper
court simplifies this test further by allowing for "rough justice" in determin-
ing the Government's expenses.' Likewise, Halper allows courts to charac-
terize as remedial a sanction that is somewhat higher than the Government's
costs. 2s 9
The Healy court erred in deviating from this simple calculus. The only
scenario in which a sanction that is lower than the Government's costs might
282. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (discussing court's finding that
OSHA was punitive in this case due to lack of consideration of Government's costs in statute).
283. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text (discussing court's finding that
sanction was punitive because Government was not victim in case).
284. See supra notes 213-72 and accompanying text (discussing why Healy court was
incorrect in finding sanction to be punitive).
285. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (stating rule that sanction is
punitive if court cannot explain it by remedial purposes and must instead explain it as deterrent
or retributive); United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating Halper
rule was to see if "rational relation" to Government's losses could be found), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997); Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Halper
by examining sanction to see if it could "fairly be said solely to serve remedial goals"); United
States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 134 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing Halper rule and stating that if
sanction "bears a rational relationship to the goal of compensating the government for its
loss... [then] double jeopardy is not violated").
286. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
287. See United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
Halper creates "balancing test").
288. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (stating that "the process of affixing a sanction that
compensates the Government for all its costs inevitably involves an element of rough justice").
289. See United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that




be considered punishment would be when the statute can only be described
as punitive.2' That was not the case in Healy.2 9' Because OSHA is
remedial2' and does not preclude compensating the Government 93 and
because distinguishing between remedial and compensatory was mistaken,
294
the Seventh Circuit should have applied the "balancing test" set forth in
Halper.2' By applying this test, it is clear that the sanction was rationally
related to the Government's damages and was, therefore, remedial.2 Thus,
the Hudson approach is generally correct. The only time a court should
deviate from a simple comparison of the sanction and the Government's costs
is when the court is faced with a statute that the court cannot explain in
remedial terms.
V. Conclusion
The question of when a civil money sanction constitutes punishment
remains for the Supreme Court to clarify. In clarifying Halper, the Court
should reject the reasoning of Healy. The dicta in Halper and the interpreta-
tions of other circuits support the conclusion that courts should read Halper
narrowly.2' Courts should not automatically consider sanctions based on
290. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. The Court stated:
To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punish-
ment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put,
a civil, as well as a criminal, sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as
applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.
Id. This supports the argument that if the regulatory statute cannot generally be described as
serving remedial goals, then the sanction applied under that statute cannot be described as
remedial.
291. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text (discussing remedial goals of OSHA
sanction applied in Healy).
292. See supra notes 213-44 and accompanying text (arguing that OSHA and sanction
applied in Healy are remedial).
293. See supra note 242-43 and accompanying text (arguing that list of considerations in
OSHA is not exclusive).
294. See supra notes 260-72 and accompanying text (arguing that remedial/compensatory
distinction applied in Healy was not appropriate test to determine if sanction was punitive).
295. United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954, 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Halper
created "balancing test").
296. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906,
908 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that sanction was $249,900 while Government's costs of investiga-
tion and prosecution were over $490,000), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S.
Feb. 13, 1997) (No. 96-1299).
297. See supra Part IV (discussing narrow interpretations of Halper by other courts and
arguing for narrow reading of Halper).
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statutes that do not provide for consideration of the Government's costs to
be punitive."8 If the sanction can otherwise be considered remedial, as was
the case with the OSHA sanction in Healy, courts should not label it as
punishment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should not apply the distinc-
tion between remedial and compensatory sanctions developed in Healy in
future cases because of its contradiction with the language of Halper, the
Hudson decision, and the understandings of other circuits."M The Court
should not follow the analysis of the Healy court, but rather should follow
the narrow interpretations announced by other circuits. Halper stated that
its holding was for unique cases. 300 The Court should honor that language
and avoid broad interpretations that would result in the effective loss of civil
remedies under numerous regulatory statutes.30'
298. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that Government can receive compensation for costs
even if statute does not provide for consideration of such matters).
299. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text (arguing against future applications
of distinction between remedial and compensatory applied in Healy).
300. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (stating Court's intent that
decision apply to narrow range of cases).
301. See supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing potential effects of extension of Healy holding).
1226
